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Abstract
The literature on the impact of an abundance of natural resources on economic performance
remains inconclusive. In this paper we consider the possibility that countries may follow different
growth regimes, and test the hypothesis that whether natural resources are a curse or a blessing
depends on the growth regime to which economy belongs. We follow recent work that has used a
mixture of regression method to identify different growth regimes, and find two regimes such that in
one regime resources have a positive impact on growth, while in the other they have a negative impact
or at best have no impact on growth. Our analysis of the determinants of whether a country belongs
or not to the blessed resources regime indicates that the level of democracy plays an important role
while education and economic institutions have no effect.
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1 Introduction
During the last decade the question of the impact of an abundance of natural resources on growth
and its transmission channels has received substantial attention. Despite the extensive literature on the
topic, no consensus has emerged on whether natural resources are a curse or a blessing. On the one hand,
there is evidence of a negative marginal impact of natural resources on economic performance (see Sachs
and Warner (1999), Sachs and Warner (2001), Gylfason (2001) and Leite and Weidmann (2002) among
others). Different channels of transmission have been proposed to explain the curse, starting with the
Dutch Disease (Corden (1984)). It has also been suggested that the curse can be due to rent-seeking
behavior that increases tariffs and/or corruption, which in turn reduce growth (see Bardhan (1997) and
Leite and Weidmann (2002)), and that natural resources crowd-out education (Gylfason (2001)) and
quality of institutions (Sachs and Warner (1999)). On the other hand, more recent evidence rejects the
curse. For instance Manzano and Rigobon (2007) find no evidence of the resource curse when adding
country fixed-effects, while the results in Alexeev and Conrand (2009) support a robust positive impact of
natural resources on gdp. Moreover, the success of countries such as Botswana,1 rich in natural resources
and with high growth rates, challenges the notion of curse.
Recent empirical evidence has thus started to determine conditions under which the curse can be
turned into a blessing by allowing for heterogeneity in the coefficients on natural resources (see Bravo-
Ortega and De-gregorio (2007), Mehlum et al. (2006), Andersen and Aslaksen (2008), Collier and Hoeﬄer
(2009)). The common approach in those papers is to interact natural resources with variables such as
education or institutions, to determine whether for instance an increase of the level of education decreases
the magnitude of the curse and at some level could turned the curse into blessing. This approach allows
for heterogeneity in the impact of some variables, yet they impose, without testing, common coefficients
on most of the regressors included in the models, thus neglecting heterogeneity on other regressors that
may have an impact on the coefficients of our variable of interest, natural resources.
This paper contributes to the literature addressing the heterogeneity in the resource curse by consid-
ering the fact that countries are heterogeneous and may follow different growth regimes or processes, and
ask the question of whether the sign of the impact of natural resources depends on the growth regime
that a given country belongs to. We suggest that there may be multiple growth regimes such that the
marginal impact of explanatory variables on growth differs across regimes, enabling us to test whether an
abundance of natural resources has a negative impact on growth in some regimes and a positive impact
in other regimes. To shed light on the role of education and institutions, we employ a different strategy
compared to the previous papers. We test whether education / or institutions affect the probability of
1Also, Norway, Canada and the United States are examples of countries rich in natural resources but do not suffer from
the curse of natural resources.
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a given country belonging to the blessed growth regimes. We estimate a finite mixture of regressions
model, a semi-parametric method for modeling unobserved heterogeneity in the data, in which countries
are sorted into regimes depending on the similarity of the conditional distribution of their growth rates
given all the explanatory variables. This approach presents two main advantages. First, we relax the
hypothesis of a single growth regime and allow the data to detect the number of regimes, which gives more
flexibility and a better fit compared to the literature in which one growth regime is imposed. Second,
instead of imposing a priori groups of countries (for instance some studies divide samples into high- and
low-income countries, democracies and autocracies), we sort countries into blessed and cursed regimes
in terms of their estimated posterior probability of being in one or another regime, which we endogenise
and suppose to be a function of education, institutions and geographic features.
Our results indicate that the data is best generated by a model of two regimes, one in which an
abundance of natural resources has a positive impact on growth and one in which it has a neutral or a
negative impact depending on the measure of natural resources that we consider. We also find that more
democracy increases the probability of a given country belonging to the blessed regime but economic
institutions and education do not have an impact on that probability. The geographical location such as
being a Sub-Saharan African or Latin-American country has no impact on the classification of countries
into regimes. In the first regime the average annual growth rate is 2.32% and 42% of countries belongs
to this group, while the annual growth rate in the second group is 1.5% with 58% of countries belonging
to it. There is substantial heterogeneity within each group both in term of gdp levels and geographical
location, indicating that democracy is not acting as a proxy for these features.
This paper is related to three strands of literature on empirics of growth. First it contributes to the
literature on the relationship between natural resources and economic performance. 2 In their seminal
work Sachs and Warner (1999) and Sachs and Warner (2001) provide evidence of a negative impact of
natural resources on growth and find no support for the idea that geographic features or climate explain
the resource curse. Further evidence on the resource curse has been provided by Gylfason (2001), Leite
and Weidmann (2002), Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) and Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007), who analyze
both the direct impact of natural resources on growth rates and the indirect one, operating through the
effect of resources on physical and human capital investments.
Our analysis follows closely the literature focusing on the conditions under which a resource curse
can be turned into a blessing, thus accounting for heterogeneity. Mehlum et al. (2006) interact natural
resources with an index of rule of law, ranging from 0 to 1, and find that the resource curse disappears
when the index of rule of law is at least 0.93. This value decreases to 0.6 when they replace the export of
primary goods in total gdp (also known as Sachs and Warner measure of natural resources) by the share of
2For a survey of the existing hypotheses and analyses see Ploeg (2011).
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mineral production in national income. Bravo-Ortega and De-gregorio (2007) show how natural resources
interact with education and find that a high level of education helps reduce the resource curse. Collier and
Hoeﬄer (2009) investigate whether democracy can offset the resources curse, and their results indicate
that a combinaison of high resource rents and democracy is growth-reducing but this negative effect can be
offset by setting checks and balances in resource rich countries. Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) examine
whether features of constitutions determine how an abundance of natural resources affects economic
growth. They find that the curse is present in democratic presidential countries but not in parliamentary
democracies, and that being parliamentary or presidential is more important than being a democracy or
an autocracy. All of these papers assume that all countries follow the same growth process and allow
for parameter heterogeneity only in some chosen variables. We propose a more flexible approach that
considers parameter heterogeneity for all the variables of the model, so that countries can belong to
different growth regimes. We then examine whether the impact of natural resources on growth differs
across regimes. Furthermore, rather than imposing the interaction between resources and a particular
variable, we consider several potential determinants of growth regime membership and test whether they
help a given country to belong to the resource blessed regime.
Our paper is also related to the literature that tests for the existence of multiple growth processes.
Starting with the Classification Analysis and Regression Tree (named CART) proposed by Durlauf and
Johnson (1995) the question of multiple growth regimes has been addressed in numerous papers. Although
the CART method is an endogenous grouping method based on thresholds of splitting variables selected
a priori, its disadvantage is the lack of available asymptotic properties that would be useful for drawing
inference on threshold variable choices and threshold values estimations. More sophisticated clustering
methods have been presented in order to make the classification as flexible as possible. Recent work has
applied the mixture of regression method to address the multiple regimes hypothesis, an approach that
presents a number of advantages over previously used methods (see section 2.2 below). Owen et al. (2009)
apply the mixture of regression method to answer the question Do all countries follow the same growth
process? and find that their panel data is best generated by two different growth processes. Using the
same methodology, Flachaire et al. (2011) examine the direct and indirect roles of economic and political
institutions in the process of development, and their results indicate that political institutions are the
main determinant of which growth regime a country belongs to, while economic institutions have an
direct impact on growth rates within each of the two regimes. Mixture regressions have also been used by
Bos et al. (2010) and Vaio and Enflo (2011) to examine respectively, growth in the very long-run (using
historical data) and the possibility of countries switching regimes. Neither of these papers considers the
role of natural resources, yet the framework is obviously suited to examine the question.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric methodology. Section 3 describes
the data while section 4 presents the main results. The next section checks the robustness of the results
while some concluding comments are provided in section 6.
2 Econometric specifications
2.1 Standard specification
The standard parametric specification of the framework is in the following form:
growthi,t = β0 + β1 log(gdp0,i,t) + β2 log(popi,t + 0.05) + β3 log(invi,t) + β4 log(educ0,i,t)
+β5NR0,i,t + β6ecoi,t + β7demi,t + εi,t
(1)
The dependent variable is the average annual growth of real gdp per capita (growthi,t) while the inde-
pendent variables are initial gdp per capita (gdp0,i,t), the population growth rate (popi,t) plus a term 0.05
capturing depreciation and technological change, the average investment rate (invi,t), the initial level of
education (educ0,i,t), the initial endowment in natural resources (NR0,i,t), the average level of economic
institutions (ecoi,t) and the average level of democracy (demi,t).
We assume that the error terms εit are identically and independently distributed and follow a normal
distribution with mean zero and variance σ2. Our parameter of interest is the coefficient on the natural
resources variable β5. A negative β5 confirms the resource curse hypothesis while a positive β5 implies
that resources are a blessing. Economic institutions have been found to be a robust determinant of
growth rates in many studies3 but there is only weak evidence that political institutions (here measured
by democracy) are a robust regressor of growth rates. Political institutions (democracy), have been found
to have a weak direct impact on growth but a strong indirect impact through the effect that economic
institutions and policies have on growth or through their impact on the choice of policies and economic
institutions in a country.4 We expect the coefficient β6 on economic institutions to be positive and
significant while we do not expect a particular sign on the coefficient on democracy, β7.
The specification in equation 1 assumes that there is a single growth model which explains the process
of development for all countries. If the observations of our dataset are not generated by a single growth
regime, the estimation of equation 1 will produce biased results. A biased estimate of the coefficient
β5 could thus lead to the wrong conclusion on whether or not there is a resource curse. For instance
if for some countries β5 is positive and for others β5 is negative, in a single regression it may turn out
insignificant. To overcome this problem we propose to use the mixture-of-regression method.
3See Glaeser et al. (2004) and Flachaire et al. (2011) among others.
4See Acemoglu et al. (2005), Eicher and Leukert (2009) and Flachaire et al. (2011).
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2.2 Finite-mixture-of-regression models
Finite-mixture-of-regression models, also known as Generalized Mixture Regression Models, are semi-
parametric methods for modeling unobserved heterogeneity of the population in the estimation of a
regression model. We relax the hypothesis of one growth regime and assume K different homogeneous
growth regimes such that the growth determinants have different marginal impacts across regimes. Thus
we are able to test whether the marginal impact of an abundance of natural resources on growth differs
across regimes.5
Let us consider (Y,X) = (yi, xi)
n
i=1 a pair of a random variable yi and a set of explanatory variables
xi. By definition, the mixture of regression based on the density of Y conditional on X is expressed as
follows:
f(y|x,Θ) =
K∑
k=1
pikfk(y|x;βk, σk) (2)
where K is the number of groups or regimes, pik is the probability of belonging to group k, and
fk(y |x;βk, σk) is a conditional probability distribution characterized by a set of parameters (βk, σk)
and of covariates x. Both βk and σk are unknown and hence estimated. We suppose fk is a Gaussian
distribution with conditional expectations equal to E(y|x) = xβk.
To illustrate, if K = 1, then all observations are generated by the same data-generating process given
by:
y = xβ + ε, ε ∼ N(0, σ2) (3)
In this case the standard specification in equation 1 is sufficient to study the impact of natural resources
on the growth rate. If K = 2 then a mixture of linear regressions assumes that an observation belonging to
the first group and one belonging to the second group would not be generated by the same data-generating
process. The mixture model with two components reduces to:
Group 1: y = xβ1 + ε1, ε1 ∼ N(0, σ21),
Group 2: y = xβ2 + ε2, ε2 ∼ N(0, σ22),
(4)
where ε1 and ε2 are independent and identical normally distributed error terms within each group, with
variances of σ21 and σ
2
2 , respectively. In this setting the impact of natural resources on growth could be
different in the two regimes because the environment in which growth occurs is different across regimes.
Since we are also interested in testing whether institutions and/or education help to classify countries
into growth regimes, we extend the model in equation 2 by adding a set of additional variables ω,
also known as concomitant variables, that explain group membership. Concomitant variables play the
same role as covariates in a multinomial regression model designed to explain group membership. They
5Since this approach has been used before to analyze growth regimes we do not give all the steps of the functional form
of the mixture of regression methods for panel data. For more details the reader is invited to refer to Owen et al. (2009).
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directly affect the probability of a given country being in one or another growth regime, implying that
parameter pik(.) becomes endogenous. The roles of standard covariates x and of concomitant variables ω
are different: standard covariates help to explain variations within groups, whereas concomitant variables
explain variations between groups. Equation 2 with concomitant variables becomes:
f(y|x, ω,Θ) =
K∑
k=1
pik(ω, αk)fk(y|x;βk, σk), (5)
where αk is a vector of parameters on concomitant variables ω and its sign helps to determine how a
variation of ω impacts the probabilities of countries being in one or another regime.
For a given number of components K we estimate the finite mixture model by maximum likelihood
with the EM algorithm of Dempster et al. (1977), which is the most common approach for the maxi-
mum likelihood estimation of finite mixture models. To avoid a singularity problem we ensure that the
estimated parameter of σk is different from zero. The number of groups K is a priori unknown and the
selection of the optimal value is crucial since it gives the true number of growth regimes generated by the
data. We choose the optimal value of K by minimizing the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) devel-
oped by Schwarz (1978), and the Corrected Information Criterion (CAIC, see Burnham and Anderson
(2002)). Those criteria are defined as follow:
BIC = −2ˆ`+ (#param) log n (6)
CAIC = −2ˆ`+ (#param)2n
n− (#param)− 1 (7)
where ˆ` is the estimated value of the log-likelihood and n is the number of observations. Once parameters
are estimated, we can use Bayes rule to compute the probability that a given country is allocated to a
given group k. The equation is written as follows:
pˆiik =
pik(wi, αˆk)fk(yi|xi ; βˆk, σˆk)∑K
k=1 pik(ωi, αˆk)fk(yi|xi ; βˆk, σˆk)
(8)
For classification purposes, a given country i will be allocated in group k rather than group l if and
only if pˆiik > pˆiil.
We will apply the mixture of regression method to equation 1, using as concomitant variables average
levels of economic institutions ( eco), democracy (dem) and the initial level of education (log(educ70)),
as well a Sub-Saharan Africa dummy and a Latin-America dummy to control for geographical location.
The use of the mixture of regression models has at least three advantages. First, it allows to treat
endogenously unobserved heterogeneity by considering simultaneously all the covariates and allowing
them to have different marginal impacts across regimes. Second, countries are sorted into regimes in terms
of probabilities which are a function of concomitant variables, thus we can compare the role of education,
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geography and institutions in allocating countries into regimes. Finally, the number of homogeneous
growth regimes is a priori unknown and are selected optimally with respect to some information criterion.
This means that if there are more than two ways in which resources affect growth, we should be able to
identify them. It is important to note that our approach does not consider the indirect impact of natural
resource through variables such as investment or education, a question that has received substantial
attention in the literature (See Gylfason (2001)). In addition our model constrains countries not to be in
different regimes at different periods since the concomitant variables are constant.6
3 Data and descriptive statistics
We build a 5-year panel of developed and developing countries for the period 1970-2005, which yields
7 periods: 1970-1975, 1975-1980, 1980-1985, 1985-1990, 1990-1995, 1995-2000 and 2000-2005. All the
variables used except education, the measures of natural resources and institutions are from the Penn
World Tables (version 6.3). Education comes from Barro and Lee (2010) and is measured by the average
years of schooling in the population aged over 25. Our main measure of natural resource abundance
is the share of exports of primary goods in total GDP (xgdp) which includes fuel and non-fuel goods.
This measure, first proposed by Sachs and Warner (1999), has been extensively used in the literature.
The data are provided by the World Development Indicators (WDI). Non-fuels goods comprise metals
and ores, agricultural raw materials and food. In our analysis we will first use the aggregate measure
of natural resources (xgdp). Sachs and Warner (2001) argue that the natural resources effect should be
linked to the magnitude of economic rents they generate and it is possible that different types of resources
yield higher or lower rents7, hence we will distinguish minerals from agricultural goods since minerals
yield in general higher rents. We will hence disaggregate xgdp into its three components8: metal and
ores (Metal −Ores), agricultural raw materials and food (Agri− food) and fuel (Fuel). Some authors
(for instance Gylfason (2001)) define the share of primary exports as natural resources intensity rather
than natural resources abundance, 9 so we will also use the rent per capita,10 as a measure for natural
6The question of regime migration is a complex one and has been recently addressed by Bos et al. (2010).
7The different types of natural resources may have a difference in term of factors intensity, ownerships and costs of
extraction which may imply a difference quantities of extracted rents (See Leite and Weidmann (2002)).
8As documented in the World Bank data Agricultural raw materials exports correspond to the SITC section 2 excluding
divisions 22, 27 (crude fertilizers and minerals excluding coal, petroleum, and precious stones), and 28 (metalliferous ores
and scrap); Food exports Food comprises the commodities in SITC sections 0 (food and live animals), 1 (beverages and
tobacco), 4 (animal and vegetable oils and fats) and SITC division 22 (oil seeds, oil nuts, and oil kernels); Ores and
metals comprise the commodities in SITC sections 27 (crude fertilizer, minerals nes) 28 (metalliferous ores, scrap), and 68
(non-ferrous metals) and Fuel exports comprise SITC section 3 (mineral fuels).
9The idea behind is that a country like Norway, has a low share of exports of primary products in total GDP because it
has also developed the others sectors of the economy.
10Rent is defined as total revenue from natural resources divided by the population. The rent is provided by the WDI
and it includes rent from energy, minerals and forest. Energy refers to crude oil, natural gas and coal, and mineral refers to
bauxite, copper, iron, lead, nickel, tin, zinc, gold and silver. The rent of a unit of resource is defined as the gap between its
world price and its country-specific extraction costs both expressed in US dollars, the obtained measure is then multiplied
by the total quantity of resources extracted.
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resources abundance in the robustness section.
Turning to the measures of institutions, we distinguish political institutions from economic institu-
tions. Political institutions refer to how political choices are made while economic institutions refer to the
consistency of those choices with voluntary exchange and the protection of property rights. We measure
political institutions by the index of democracy from Polity IV, and economic institutions by the index
of the Economic Freedom in the world from the Fraser Institute compilation.11 The democracy index
takes into account the competitiveness of executive recruitment, the openness of executive recruitment,
the constraints on the executive, and the competitiveness of political participation. It ranges between 0
and 10, with a value of 0 denoting an autocratic government and a value of 10 full democracy. Economic
freedom measures the extent to which property rights are protected and the freedom that individuals have
to engage in voluntary transactions. This measure takes into account the respect of personal choices, the
voluntary exchanges coordinated by markets, freedom to enter and compete in markets, and protection
of persons and their property from aggression by others.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and data sources. Note that eco, dem, log(educ1970), Sub-Afri
and Latin are concomitant variables, where eco and dem are the average value of economic institutions and
democracy over the period 1970-2005, educ1970 is the level of education in 1970 and Sub-Afri and Latin
are respectively dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa countries and dummy for Latin-America dummy. Table 2
shows the correlation coefficients between variables. The correlation between the growth rate and the
aggregate natural resources variable (xgdp) is negative, in line with the resource curse theory. In addition
xgdp is negatively correlated with investment in physical and human capital (log(inv), log(educ0)) and
these variables are in turn positively correlated with the growth rate. This suggests that there may
be an indirect negative impact of natural resources on growth through the investments in physical and
human capital as already found in the literature (see Gylfason (2001), Atkinson and Hamilton (2003),
Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004)). Turning to the correlations between natural resources and institutions,
the natural resource measure (xgdp) is negatively correlated with both measures of institutions but the
correlation with democracy is much higher. When we consider the disaggregated measures of natural
resources only the measure of fuel (Fuel) is positively correlated with the growth rate, initial gdp per
capita and investment in physical capital.
11These two measures are used in Flachaire et al. (2011) where authors explain how political and economic institutions
enhance differently the economic development of countries
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4 Results and discussion
4.1 Standard model results
We start by reproducing some of the results found in the literature in cross section analysis, reported
in Table 3 column (1). The dependent variable, the growth rate and the explanatory variables (except
for initial gdp, education and natural resources) are averaged for the entire 35-year period. We measure
initial gdp, education and natural resources at the starting year 1970. We use the aggregate measure of
natural resources (xgdp). In this and all subsequent tables NR always denotes natural resources, which
can be measured in different ways. The coefficient on natural resources is negative and significant at the
conventional level 1%, suggesting that an abundance of natural resources reduces growth. The coefficient
on NR (-0.044) is roughly comparable to that in Sachs and Warner (2001), table 2 columns (2) and (3),
where the resource curse hypothesis is analyzed for the period 1970-1989. One issue with the cross-section
data is the low number of observations (71 obs) due to the limitation of the number of countries. The low
number of observations may also be a problem when estimating the mixture model since the number of
parameters increases with the number of growth regimes K, requiring more observations. One possibility
to increase the number of observations in growth regressions is to use panel data. Thus the rest of the
paper is based on panel data.
We report in columns (2)-(4) of table 3 respectively the pooled, the fixed effects and the random
effects estimations when using panel data. The coefficient on natural resources is negative in almost all
columns but it is never significant. This confirms the results in Manzano and Rigobon (2007) who find
that the resource curse hypothesis disappears once panel data with fixed-effects are used. Turning now
to the other variables in the regression, the negative signs on initial gdp log(gdp) are consistent with
the beta-convergence hypothesis between countries and the coefficients on the economic institutions, eco,
have the expected sign and are significant at the 1% level. Not surprisingly more democracy does not
stimulate growth, as already found in previous work.12 The Hausman test of the appropriateness of the
random-effects model gives a low p-value of 0.001 which suggests that the random-effects model is less
appropriate than the fixed-effects one.
It is well-known fact that both institutional quality and educational attainment may be determined by
economic performance, and the literature on natural resources has also discussed the problem of causality
between natural resources and economic performance. For instance the denominator of our main measure
for NR is gdp per capita. Thus if two countries export the same amount of natural resources, the country
with a lower level of gdp per capita will be resource rich while that with a higher level of gdp will
be considered as resource poor. To deal with this possible endogeneity, we use IV estimation with
12Barro (1996), Glaeser et al. (2004) and Flachaire et al. (2011) support that the empirical evidence does not establish
a direct link between political institutions and economic performance.
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the first lags of education, NR and both institutions as instruments. The last two columns in table 3
present estimation results with instrumental variables for the pooled and random-effects models. The
estimations in column (5) are close to those in column (2) except that education and democracy now
become insignificant. The estimates in columns (4) and (6) are very similar. In all specifications the
coefficient of the variable of interest, natural resources, remains insignificant.
These results support neither a resource curse nor a resource blessing when using standard models on
panel data. One possible cause for the absence of significant coefficients on natural resources is that there
exists unobserved heterogeneity in the data. In fact the assumption that all countries follow the same
growth regime may be too constraining, raising a doubt on the estimates and enabling us to figure out
whether natural resources are a curse or a blessing. Hence we suppose that our data could be generated by
multiple growth regimes, and that an abundance of natural resources may have different marginal impacts
across regimes. Under this assumption we apply the mixture of regression method to take into account
heterogeneity. Although the panel fixed-effect takes into account the heterogeneity in the constant term
the mixture of regression method has the advantage of taking into account endogenously the heterogeneity
on the explanatory variables by allowing them to have different marginal impacts across growth regimes.
4.2 Mixture-of-regression results
We next estimate the mixture model with concomitant variables and allow the number of groups K
to vary between 1 and 4, estimating 4 models. As in the previous panel data estimations, our dependent
variable is the annual rate of growth averaged over five-years and the standard covariates are the initial
gdp per capita, the population growth rate averaged over five-years, the initial level of education, the
initial quantity of natural resources, and the five-years average of investment, economic institutions and
democracy. As concomitant variables we use the average level of democracy and of economic institutions
over the 35-year period, the initial level of education in 1970, a Sub-Saharan Africa dummy and a Latin-
America dummy. We report the values of the BIC and CAIC in table 4. Both of the information criteria
are minimized for K=2, allowing us to select the model with two growth regimes as the model that
best fits the data. According to the two test statistics, the two-regime model presents a substantial
improvement over estimating a single regime model (BIC=2282.6 for K=2 versus BIC=1353.8 for K=1).
Recall that the estimations of the model where K=1 is reported in column (2) of table 3, where we found
no impact of natural resources on growth rate.
Table 5 shows the estimated parameters of the selected mixture model. The coefficients on natural
resources support our hypothesis that an abundance of natural resources has different impacts on growth
across regimes. While there is a resource blessing in the first regime, an abundance of natural resources
is neutral in the second regime. We also test whether the coefficients on NR are statistically different
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across regimes, reporting the Wald test in column 3. The null hypothesis under which the coefficients on
NR are equal across the two growth regimes is statistically rejected by the Wald test at the 5% level.
The coefficients on initial income, on investment in physical and human capital and on institutions are
also statistically different across regimes. Investments in physical and human capital have a positive and
significant impact on growth for the first group, but education does not affect growth for the second
one. Economic institutions are beneficial for growth in both regimes while political institutions do not
matter for the second regime but affect negatively the growth rate in the first group. Recent literature
has tried to explain why it has been so difficult to find a robust positive effect of political institutions
on growth and suggests that in contrary to the economic institutions their impact on growth may be
indirect. For instance Acemoglu et al. (2005) propose the hierarchy of institutions hypothesis , which
indicates that political institutions set the stage in which economic institutions and policies operate. The
results in Flachaire et al. (2011) find support for the hierarchy of institutions hypothesis when using the
mixture-of-regression approach in a panel of developped and developping countries covering.
We turn now to the coefficients on the concomitant variables. Recall that the concomitant variables
play the same role as covariates in the multinomial logit estimations, so that only the signs of the coeffi-
cients have an interpretation. Our group of reference here is the first one, the one for which resources have
a positive impact on growth. The results show a negative and very significant coefficient on democracy,
indicating that an increase of the level of democracy decreases the probability for a given country to
be in the second regime rather than in the first regime. Both economic institutions, education and the
geographical location do not affect the regime membership probability.
We find that 42% of countries are in the first group against 58% in the second group. Table 6 shows
the classification of countries into growth regimes with their respective probability. Some countries from
different regions and countries with different levels of development follow the same growth process. For
instance Bangladesh, Botswanna and the Republic of Congo and Mali are in the same group as most of
the Western countries, while Ireland and Portugal are in the same group as most of poor countries.
The bottom panel of Table 6 reports the average values of the dependent and main independent
variables for the two groups as well as the within group standard deviations in parenthesis. The average
growth rate is equal to 2.32% for the first group against 1.50% for the second group. The standard
deviation is much lower in the first group than in the second group which could be explained by the high
diversity of countries in the latter group. The average value of exports of primary goods is twice as low
in the first group as in the second. Regarding institutions, there is only a small difference on the average
values of economic institutions but the level of democracy is much higher in the first group than in the
resource blessing group.
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As already discussed in the section 4 above, the endogeneity issue is important in the literature but
still finding good institutions for natural resources and in particular for institutions remains difficult. Also
we are not aware of a procedure that allows to estimate mixture models using instrumental variables and
proceed in two step. This last point could be an interesting contribution in the mixture of regression
framework. To consider the endogeneity problem we perform a standard IV estimations for each of the
group derived previously from the mixture of regression estimation. We use as instruments one-period
lags of education, natural resources and institutions. The results are reported in Table 7 and show that
coefficients are very closed to those reported in Table 5.
5 Robustness Analysis
To test the robustness of our results we run a number of further estimations. First, we use different
measures for natural resources, the disaggregated components of our main measure xgdp and the rent
per capita in logs. Second, we use alternative measures of political institutions which we have found to
be important for the classification of countries into growth regimes. Lastly, we will include an interaction
term between natural resources and education.
5.1 Alternative measures for natural resources
Table 8 shows additional evidence on the existence of two growth regimes when we use alternative
measures of natural resources, as the information criterion selection always gives 2 growth regimes. We
first focused on the disagragated measures of xgdp, our main measure of natural resource abundance in
the previous estimations. It is important to shed light on how the different components of xgdp affect
growth in a multiple growth regime analysis. There may be different reasons to believe that the different
components of xgdp may have different impacts on growth across regimes. For example mineral sectors
yield in general higher rents than agricultural sectors and fuel sectors (see Sachs and Warner (2001)).
Leite and Weidmann (2002) mention that although those components are different in term of factor
intensity, they also have differences in term of ownership and in term of time of extraction, implying
different costs and different processes, and thus different rents.
We report the estimations of the K=2 mixture models in table 9. For Metal−Ores, the results support
the existence of a resource blessing in the first regime and a resource curse in the second regime. The
level of democracy helps to split countries into regimes, with more democracy increasing the probability
for a given country to be in the resources blessed regime. The Wald test, which is not reported, rejects
the hypothesis of the equality of the coefficients on natural resources across regimes. Similarly, when
we consider agricultural raw and food (Agri-Food) as the measure of natural resource abundance, we
find again a resource blessing in the first regime and resources curse in the second regime. For Fuel we
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have no effect of natural resources on growth in the second regime and a positive one in the first. In all
cases the level of democracy is an important determinant of the probability for countries to be classified
into regimes, while education and regional dummies tend to play no role. Only in the case of Fuel the
Latin American dummy decreases the probability to be in the resources blessing regime. Note that the
magnitude of the coefficient on natural resources in absolute value is higher for Metal − Ores than for
Agri−food and Fuel. One possible explanation is that mineral sectors yield in general higher rents than
agricultural sectors and fuel sectors due to the difference in term of costs and in term of capital intensity
as already mentioned in the previous paragraph.
Considering rent per capita as our measure of resources, we find resource blessing in the first group
but no impact in the second one. As before, the level of democracy enhances the classification of countries
into regimes, while the Sub-Africa dummy is now significant indicating that being a Sub-Africa country
reduces the probability to belong to the blessed resource group.
5.2 Alternative measures for democracy
Our second specification to check the robustness of our results is to change the measure of democracy
that we find important in the classification of countries. We replace the Polity IV measure with data
from Golder (2005). These data provide measures for a wide range of institutions including regime type,
the electoral system and the assembly size. Data are available for a large number of countries over
the 1946-2000. We use demautoc, a dummy which is equal to 1 for democracies and 0 for autocracies.
As explanatory variable we take the initial value of demautoc at the beginning of each period and as
concomitant variable the value in 1970. We will also add to the concomitant variables a dummy denoted
presdem70 which is equal to 1 for presidential democracies in 1970 and 0 for parliamentary or mixed
democracies. 13 Results are reported in table 10. We find again two growth regimes whereby an
abundance of natural resources is beneficial in one regime and negative or neutral in the other. Being a
democracy remains a key determinant of the probability of being in the blessed regime but the type of
democratic system does not matter for the classification of countries into regimes. These results differ
from the conclusion in Andersen and Aslaksen (2008), where the authors interact in a single growth
regime natural resources resources with institutional features. They provide evidence that the curse is
present in presidential democracies but not in parliamentary democracies, while being an autocracy does
not explain the curse.
13See Persson (2005) for the role of constitutions on economic development and Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) for natural
resources and constitutions.
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5.3 Education and natural resources
Education has been found to be important in the resource curse literature (see Gylfason (2001) and
Bravo-Ortega and De-gregorio (2007)) but our previous results do not show that education helps to split
countries into blessed and cursed regimes. One explanation could be that education has a different role,
from that of institutions. Following Bravo-Ortega and De-gregorio (2007) who interact education and
natural resources in order to examine whether an increase in the level of education decreases the negative
impact of natural resources on growth, we add the term (log(educ) ∗NR) to the regressors. For ease of
computation we also exclude all the concomitant variables that where never significant in the previous
estimations. The values of the information criteria are not reported, but the model with two growth
regimes is again selected for each of the measures of natural resources we consider.
The estimations of the selected models are reported in table 11. Our result that natural resources have
a positive impact in one regime but a negative or neutral effect in the other is robust, and democracy still
helps to split countries into regimes. When we use the aggregated measure xgdp and the rent per capita
Rent as the measures of natural resource the coefficient on the interact term (log(educ)*NR) indicates
that more education decreases the marginal effect of natural resource on growth in the blessed regime (or
group 1). However, when we replace the measure of natural resource by Ores−Metal results show that
more education decreases the resource curse. There are no other important changes in the coefficients on
the other explanatory variables.
6 Conclusion
This paper has tested a new hypothesis that has not yet been addressed by the literature that has tried
to understand the conditions under which natural resources can be a blessing. We go beyond existing
studies and test whether the impact of natural resources depends on the growth regime to which an
economy belongs. To do so we consider that countries may follow different growth processes or regimes
such that the marginal impact of explanatory variables on growth differs across regimes, enabling us to
test whether natural resources are a curse or a blessing within each regime.
Our results indicate that for the period 1970-2005 the data is best fitted by a model of two regimes.
In one regime an abundance of natural resources has a significant positive impact on growth, while
in the other regime an abundance of natural resources does not enhance growth. The analysis of the
determinants of whether a country belongs or not to the blessed resources regime indicates that the level
of democracy plays a crucial role, while education and economic institutions have no effect. We also find
that the form of government (such as being parliamentary or presidential democracy) matters less for
the regime membership than being democratic or autocratic. Moreover, once we control for the degree of
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democracy being a Sub-Saharan African or a Latin-American does not seem to be relevant to determine
whether a country belongs to the blessed regime.
The policy implication of this analysis is that, resource rich countries that have suffered from their
endowment in natural resources should try to figure out how to move to the resource blessed regimes,
thus changing the environment in which growth occurs. External aid aimed at improving education
(although it has benefits in itself) will not help countries to use their natural resource endowments in a
growth-enhancing manner but promoting democracy (parliamentary or presidential) would increase the
probability of the resource rich countries to be in the environment in which natural resources could be
beneficial for their development. This last point supports the ’neocon agenda’ defined by Selden (2004)
that emphasizes the importance of encouraging democratic institutions in resource-rich economies.
Our analysis has only considered the direct impact of natural resources, future works on the link
between natural resources and economic development should consider the indirect mechanism of the curse
in a multiple growth regimes analysis by modeling a system of simultaneous equations using a mixture
of regression approach. Also the two step stage method in the mixture model framework remains suited
for the endogeneity issue.
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Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max Description Data source
growth 498 1.82 2.75 -13.60 11.07 Average annual growth rate PWT 6.3
log(gdp) 498 8.77 1.01 6.43 10.64 Log of initial real GDP per capita PWT 6.3
log(pop + 0.05) 498 1.89 .16 1.49 2.33 Log of population growth + technol-
ogy growth + depreciation rate
PWT 6.3
log(inv) 498 3.01 .50 1.25 4.05 Log of investment rate PWT 6.3
log(educ) 498 1.58 .68 -1.64 2.57 Log of initial average years of educa-
tion of the total population aged over
25
Barro and Lee 2010
dem 498 5.83 3.99 0 10 Political institutions: degree of
democracy (Polity IV)
www.systemicpeace.org,
Polity IV project
eco 498 6.01 0.81 2.68 8.66 Economic institutions: index of Eco-
nomic Freedom of the World
www.freetheworld.com,
version 2009
xgdp 498 12.92 12.43 .23 76.07 Initial level of exports of primary
goods over total gdp
World Development In-
dicators(2010)
Metal-Ores 492 2.14 5.74 < 0000 55.44 Initial level of exports of metal and
ores over total gdp
World Development In-
dicators(2010)
Agri-food 498 6.92 7.25 .001 44.15 Initial level of exports of agriculture
and food goods over total gdp
World Development In-
dicators(2010)
Fuel 482 4.01 9.08 < 0000 63.12 Initial level of exports of fuel over to-
tal gdp
World Development In-
dicators(2010)
log(educ1970) 91 1.58 0.89 -1.64 2.39 Log of initial average years of educa-
tion of the total population aged over
25
Barro and Lee 2010
dem 91 5.19 3.54 0 10 Political institutions: degree of
democracy (Polity IV)
www.systemicpeace.org,
Polity IV project
eco 91 1.01 1.07 4.31 8.14 Economic institutions: index of Eco-
nomic Freedom of the World
www.freetheworld.com,
version 2009
Table 1: Data descriptive and sources
growth log(gdp) log(pop) log(inv) log(educ) dem eco xgdp Metal-Ores Agri-Food Fuel
growth 1.00
log(gdp) 0.06 1.00
log(pop) -0.21 -0.66 1.00
log(inv) 0.24 0.58 -0.43 1.00
log(educ) 0.11 0.77 -0.59 0.45 1.00
dem 0.07 0.63 -0.62 0.38 0.63 1.00
eco 0.26 0.58 -0.41 0.33 0.51 0.46 1.00
xgdp -0.07 -0.16 0.33 -0.06 -0.12 -0.28 -0.08 1.00
Metal-Ores -0.16 -0.06 0.19 -0.06 -0.04 -0.20 -0.01 0.45 1.00
Agri-Food -0.04 -0.31 0.27 -0.11 -0.15 -0.13 -0.05 0.52 -0.01 1.00
Fuel 0.03 0.04 0.13 0.02 -0.05 -0.18 -0.07 0.68 -0.01 -0.08 1.00
Table 2: Coefficients of correlation
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Cross-Section Panel Data
Variable Ols Ols FE RE OlS-IV RE-IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(gdp) −1.150
(0.311)
∗∗∗ −1.469
(0.219)
∗∗∗ −5.130
(0.509)
∗∗∗ −2.298
(0.276)
∗∗∗ −1.454
(0.263)
∗∗∗ −2.483
(0.334)
∗∗∗
log(pop+0.05) −0.911
(1.652)
−5.151
(1.035)
∗∗∗ −5.858
(1.669)
∗∗∗ −6.305
(1.276)
∗∗∗ −5.592
(1.157)
∗∗∗ −6.364
(1.448)
∗∗∗
log(inv) 1.420
(0.432)
∗∗∗ 1.402
(0.280)
∗∗∗ 2.109
(0.520)
∗∗∗ 1.590
(0.360)
∗∗∗ 1.526
(0.340)
∗∗∗ 1.918
(0.423)
∗∗∗
log(educ) 0.619
(0.314)
0.637
(0.285)
∗∗ 0.252
(0.628)
0.972
(0.373)
∗∗∗ 0.515
(0.381)
1.182
(0.496)
∗∗
NR -0.044
(0.012)
∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.009)
0.019
(0.019)
-0.002
(0.013)
-0.032
(0.019)
-0.009
(0.013)
eco 0.606
(0.266)
∗∗ 0.991
(0.142)
∗∗∗ 1.409
(0.216)
∗∗∗ 1.363
(0.175)
∗∗∗ 0.815
(0.176)
∗∗∗ 1.064
(0.239)
∗∗∗
dem −0.005
(0.081)
0.092
(0.040)
∗∗ −0.131
(0.054)
∗∗ −0.069
(0.046)
−0.085
(0.0565)
−0.032
(0.078)
Constant 4.899
(4.721)
13.34
(2.864)
∗∗∗ 18.97
(3.485)
∗∗∗ 19.84
(3.565)
∗∗∗ 15.03
(3.209)
∗∗∗ 21.48
(3.866)
∗∗∗
time dummies .. .. .. .. ..
nobs 71 498 498 498 388 388
ncountries 71 91 91 91 83 83
R-squared 0.44 0.23 0.36 0.32 0.25 0.22
Hausman test < 0.001
(3)-(4)
Table 3: Standard estimations. We use the aggregate measure of exports of primary goods xgdp for the
natural resources variable. Time dummies are include for panel data estimations. For Hausman test, the
p-value is reported. For IV estimation, first lags of log(educ), NR, eco and dem are used as instruments.
Standard Errors are in parenthesis, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%.
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BIC CAIC
K=1 2353.8 2368.8
K=2 2280.3 2316.3
K=3 2299.4 2356.4
K=4 2304.3 2382.3
Table 4: Panel data: selection of the mixture models. BIC and CAIC criterion are reported. K is the
number of regimes. We use the aggregate measure of natural resources xgdp to measure NR. Selected
model in bold.
Variable Mixture Wald test
group 1
(42%)
group 2
(58%)
statistic p-value
Intercept 15.409
(2.791)
∗∗∗ 13.092
(4.149)
∗∗∗ 0.22 0.64
log(gdp) −1.937
(0.247)
∗∗∗ −1.255
(0.311)
∗∗∗ 3.05 0.08
log(pop+0.05) −3.476
(0.929)
∗∗∗ −5.935
(1.507)
∗∗∗ 1.91 0.17
log(inv) 2.542
(0.261)
∗∗∗ 0.640
(0.413)
14.64 < 0.001
log(educ) 1.348
(0.278)
∗∗∗ 0.501
(0.423)
2.662 0.1
NR 0.036
(0.009)
*** -0.015
(0.014)
8.29 0.004
eco5 0.311
(0.129)
∗∗ 1.298
(0.212)
∗∗∗ 15.53 < 0.001
dem5 −0.201
(0.040)
∗∗∗ −0.039
0.058
5.143 0.023
time dummies .. ..
Concomitant
Intercept - 1.880
(2.962)
eco - −0.145
(0.509)
dem - −0.297
(0.128)
∗∗
log(educ1970) - 0.053
(0.545)
Sub-Afri - 0.737
(0.851)
Latin - 5.084
(2.882)
R2 0.56 0.26
Table 5: Panel data: estimation results of the selected mixture model in table 4 where the measure of
natural resources is xgdp. There are 91 countries and 498 observations. Time dummies are include.
Standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%.
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Group 1 Group 2
Country proba Country proba Country proba
Australia 0.99 Algeria 1 Paraguay 1
Austria 0.99 Argentina 1 Peru 1
Bangladesh 0.84 Bahrain 1 Philippines 1
Belgium 0.94 Bolivia 1 Portugal 0.95
Benin 0.52 Brazil 0.99 Sierra Leone 0.67
Botswana 0.75 Cameroon 0.99 Syria 1
Canada 0.99 Central African Rep, 1 Tanzania 0.74
China 0.97 Chile 1 Thailand 0.99
Congo.Rep, 0.96 Colombia 0.85 Togo 1
Cyprus 0.99 Costa Rica 0.98 Trinidad Tobago 1
Denmark 0.99 Cote d’Ivoire 0.97 Uganda 0.58
Finland 0.98 Dominican Rep, 0.99 Uruguay 1
France 0.99 Ecuador 1 Venezuela 0.99
Germany 0.99 Egypt 0.99 Zambia 1
Greece 0.97 El Salvador 1 Zimbabwe 1
India 0.99 Fiji 0.99
Israel 0.99 Ghana 1
Italy 0.99 Guatemala 1
Japan 0.99 Guyana 1
Korea.Rep, 0.99 Haiti 0.99
Malaysia 0.95 Honduras 1
Mali 0.87 Hungary 0.99
Netherlands 0.99 Indonesia 0.99
New Zealand 0.91 Iran 1
Norway 0.99 Ireland 0.96
Pakistan 0.99 Jamaica 1
Poland 0.93 Jordan 1
Senegal 0.74 Kenya 1
Singapore 0.99 Lesotho 0.93
South Africa 0.91 Malawi 1
Spain 0.99 Mauritius 0.99
Sri Lanka 0.89 Mexico 1
Sweden 0.99 Mozambique 1
Switzerland 0.99 Nepal 0.94
Tunisia 0.99 Nicaragua 1
Turkey 0.99 Niger 0.99
UK 0.99 Panama 1
US 0.99 Papua New Guinea 1
Group 1 Group 2
Means of key variables by group
Group 1 Group 2
growth 2.55
(1.87)
1.24
(3.17)
NR 8.78
(11.36)
16.21
(12.27)
log(educ0) 1.79
(0.71)
1.42
(0.61)
eco5 6.37
(1.08)
5.72
(0.98)
dem5 7.57
(3.51)
4.44
(3.82)
Table 6: Classification obtained from the selected mixture model with xgdp as the measure of natural
resources. The numbers are the group membership posterior probabilities
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Group 1 Group 2
Intercept 18.20
(2.858)
∗∗∗ 14.51
(4.575)
∗∗∗
log(pop+0.05) −4.345
(0.995)
∗∗∗ −6.273
(1.655)
∗∗∗
log(gdp0) −2.102
(0.267)
∗∗∗ −1.055
(0.358)
∗∗∗
log(inv5) 2.513
(0.280)
∗∗∗ 0.636
(0.452)
log(educ0) 1.490
(0.309)
∗∗∗ 0.271
(0.548)
NR0 0.027
(0.012)
** -0.028
(0.018)
dem5 −0.232
(0.057)
∗∗∗ −0.012
(0.077)
eco5 0.378
(0.149)
∗∗ 0.965
(0.278)
∗∗∗
Observations 183 224
R-squared 0.56 0.27
Under test. < 0.001 < 0.001
Weak instr. 51.5 86.0
Table 7: Panel data: IV estimations by groups, from the classification obtained in Table 6. Standard
errors in parenthesis. Time dummies are include. For under identification test, the p-value is reported. For
weak instruments tests, the value of the first-stage-F statistic is reported. Standard errors in parenthesis.
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%
Xgdp Components
Metal-Ores Agri-food Fuel Rent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
K=1 2315.8
[2330.8]
2350.4
[2365.4]
2281.1
[2296.1]
2595.3
[2610.3]
K=2 2241.9
[2277.9]
2280.7
[2316.7]
2200.3
[2236.3]
2475.9
[2511.9]
K=3 2263.9
[2320.9]
2289.7
[2346.7]
2209.4
[2266.4]
2477.3
[2534.3]
K=4 2278.2
[2356.2]
2305.9
[2383.9]
2216.6
[2294.6]
2498.6
[2576.6]
Table 8: Panel data: goodness of fit with alternative measures of natural resources. BIC and CAIC (in
brackets) are reported for each measure. Selected models are in bold.
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xgdp Metal-Ores Rent
group1
(pi1=45%)
group2
(pi2=55%)
group1
(pi1=43%)
group2
(pi2=57%)
group1
(pi1=41%)
group2
(pi2=59%)
Intercept 16.824
(3.295)
∗∗∗ 11.407
(4.218)
∗∗∗ 16.958
(2.919)
∗∗∗ 11.955
(4.389)
∗∗∗ 19.015
(2.743)
∗∗∗ −3.774
(2.845)
log(gdp) −2.016
(0.287)
∗∗∗ −1.446
(0.327)
∗∗∗ −2.271
(0.243)
∗∗∗ −1.449
(0.328)
∗∗∗ −2.324
(0.251)
∗∗∗ −1.044
(0.377)
∗∗∗
log(pop+ 0.05) −3.559
(1.036)
∗∗∗ −5.222
(1.410)
∗∗∗ −3.823
(1.002)
∗∗∗ −5.068
(1.437)
∗∗∗ −4.445
(0.919)
∗∗∗ 0.088
(0.616)
log(inv) 2.489
(0.296)
∗∗∗ 0.979
(0.417)
∗∗ 3.138
(0.293)
∗∗∗ 0.608
(0.398)
2.956
(0.314)
∗∗∗ 0.509
(0.366)
log(educ) 1.287
(0.339)
∗∗∗ 0.823
(0.416)
∗∗ 1.135
(0.265)
∗∗∗ 0.855
(0.426)
∗∗ 1.339
(0.353)
∗∗∗ 0.806
(0.422)
NR 0.039
(0.01)
*** -0.018
(0.017)
0.278
(0.079)
*** -0.086
(0.033)
*** 0.088
(0.045)
* 0.119
(0.104)
eco 0.201
(0.135)
∗∗∗ 1.306
(0.214)
∗∗ 0.346
(0.132)
∗∗∗ 1.319
(0.22)
∗∗∗ 0.273
(0.165)
1.762
(0.252)
∗∗∗
demautoc −1.328
(0.322)
∗∗∗ −0.169
(0.399)
−1.302
(0.291)
∗∗∗ −0.117
(0.393)
−1.120
(0.314)
∗∗∗ 0.226
(0.455)
time dummies .. .. .. .. .. ..
Concomitant
Intercept - 0.512
(0.396)
- 0.624
(0.385)
- 0.299
(0.501)
demautoc70 - −1.882
(0.700)
∗∗∗ - −2.058
(0.671)
∗∗∗ - −2.575
(0.899)
∗∗∗
pres70 - −1.916
(2.215)
- −1.971
(2.339)
- −3.445
(2.533)
Sub-afri - - 2.783
(1.356)
∗∗
Latin - −4.766
(2.128)
∗∗ - 4.733
(2.151)
∗∗ - 5.223
(2.434)
∗∗
R2 0.53 0.28 0.59 0.28 0.54 0.25
Table 10: Panel data: estimations with alternative measures of institutions. We replace the variable dem
by a binary variable demautoc which takes the value of 1 for democracies and 0 for autocracies. The
variable pres in the concomitant variable is equal to 1 for presidential democracies and 0 for parliamentary
or mixed democracies. Time dummies are include. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%,
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
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Variable Xgdp Ores-Metal Rent
group1
(42%)
group2
(58%)
group1
(pi1=41%)
group2
(pi2=59%)
group1
(pi1=50%)
group2
(pi2=50%)
Intercept 14.952
(2.732)
∗∗∗ 13.367
(4.205)
∗∗∗ 16.060
(2.559)
∗∗∗ 13.922
(4.269)
∗∗∗ 3.056
(1.492)
∗∗ 7.929
(4.917)
log(gdp0) −1.985
(0.243)
∗∗∗ −1.272
(0.313)
∗∗∗ −2.192
(0.234)
∗∗∗ −1.218
(0.311)
∗∗ −1.810
(0.232)
∗∗∗ −1.013
(0.385)
∗∗∗
log(pop+ 0.05) −3.355
(0.919)
∗∗∗ −5.749
(1.551)
∗∗∗ −3.608
(0.866)
∗∗∗ −6.019
(1.512)
∗∗∗ 0.115
(0.3)
−4.306
(1.738)
∗∗
log(inv) 2.544
(0.259)
∗∗∗ 0.707
(0.421)
2.969
(0.278)
∗∗∗ 0.441
(0.404)
2.957
(0.239)
∗∗∗ 0.569
(0.454)
log(educ) 1.754
(0.329)
∗∗∗ 0.039
(0.568)
1.333
(0.256)
∗∗∗ 0.022
(0.478)
2.437
(0.286)
∗∗∗ −0.509
(0.736)
NR 0.098
(0.032)
*** -0.065
(0.045)
0.388
(0.192)
** -0.232
(0.079)
*** 0.962
(0.168)
*** -0.222
(0.261)
log(educ) ∗NR -0.039
(0.019)
** 0.032
(0.027)
-0.069
(0.111)
0.123
(0.055)
** -0.402
(0.077)
*** 0.159
(0.174)
eco 0.290
(0.127)
∗∗ 1.305
(0.217)
∗∗∗ 0.407
(0.126)
∗∗∗ 1.339
(0.214)
∗∗∗ 0.398
(0.151)
∗∗∗ 1.527
(0.246)
∗∗∗
dem −0.186
(0.039)
∗∗∗ −0.039
(0.059)
−0.192
(0.038)
∗∗∗ −0.046
(0.060)
−0.140
(0.040)
∗∗∗ 0.055
(0.070)
time dummies .. .. .. .. .. ..
Concomitant
Intercept - 1.438
(0.546)
∗∗∗ - 1.597
(0.562)
∗∗∗ - 0.396
(0.599)
dem - −0.343
(0.092)
∗∗∗ - −0.363
(0.095)
∗∗∗ - −0.228
(0.091)
∗∗
Latin - 4.683
(2.483)
- 5.329
(2.623)
∗∗ - 5.037
(2.672)
Sub-afri - 0.411
(0.730)
R2 0.27 0.56 0.28 0.59 0.28 0.57
Table 11: Panel data: stimation results of the mixture model with the interact term between education
and natural resource. Time dummies are include. Standard errors in parenthesis. *** significant at 1%,
** significant at 5%. We include to the concomitant variables a Latin American dummy Latin and a
Sub-African dummy Sub-afri to controle for geography.
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